Marx and Aristotle on the Highest Good by Hunt, Ian Edgell
MARX AND ARISTOTLE ON THE HIGHEST GOOD
97
Marx and Aristotle on the Highest Good
Ian Hunt
Arstotle clams that the most perfect happness s a lfe of contemplaton, whch s a 
lfe as close to the supremely happy lves of the Gods as s possble n human lfe. Ths 
lfe s more perfectly happy because contemplaton, n takng tself as ts own object, 
cannot so easly be deprved of what s necessary for t and thus remans less subject to 
msfortune. I shall argue that, whle there are many affintes between Marx’s concep-
ton of the hghest good and ths concepton from Arstotle, Marx dffers crucally by 
takng the hghest good to be human rather than godlke. For Marx, the counterpart 
of beng removed from the vcsstudes of fortune s the reducton to a mnmum of 
what he terms the sphere of necessty. The hghest good s not a lfe of contemplaton 
but rather the pursut of ends that human bengs ndvdually and collectvely choose 
for themselves ndependently of the demands of survval and reproducton. 
1. Introduction
In Nicomachean Ethics, Arstotle consders three canddates for a lfe lved well: the 
lfe of pleasure or enjoyment; the lfe of poltcs; and the lfe of contemplaton. Ars-
totle does not nclude a lfe of exercsng techncal skll, although showng excellence 
of technque seems to gve much the same sort of reason for regardng as a lfe lved 
well as showng excellence n pursut of the truth. We may note n passng Bostock’s 
(2000:190) clam that Arstotle arbtrarly excludes the dea of excellent professonal 
lves from those lved well. It seems clear, though, that professonal lves wll be excel-
lent because they show an outstandng grasp of the truth, admrable regard to others, 
or excellence n technque. So, the substance of Arstotle’s excluson of professonal 
lves from those lved well s that he excludes a lfe showng excellence n technque. 
As Bostock suggests, ths excluson can be explaned by the lmtatons of the way of 
thnkng of ancent Greek ctzens, who looked down on havng to earn one’s lvng, 
especally by the use of techncal skll. 
Arstotle (1934:1171a) clams that the “best and most perfect” of human excel-
lences s the lfe of contemplaton, because t s closest to the actvty of the Gods and 
least vulnerable to loss of the condtons on whch t depends. By contrast, actvty 
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governed by practcal reason ams at what s just and other outcomes that benefit 
others, such as courage n battle or generous gfts. Such actons depend on the occa-
son: one cannot act justly, courageously or generously f no one needs a far share of 
goods, an enemy defeated, or a vtal need met. Because a vrtuous lfe governed by 
practcal reason requres other persons as ts object t s more vulnerable than a lfe 
of contemplaton, whch can be carred on ndependently of external condtons to a 
greater degree.
In ths paper, I shall argue that Marx’s mplct concepton of the best lfe for human 
bengs argues for a more down to earth concepton of the good lfe than Arstotle’s. He 
does ths by shftng the bass or ground of a good lfe from vrtue to freedom and re-
placng contemplaton as the most complete form of human vrtue wth “dstnctvely 
human” freedom as the most complete form of human freedom. 
Ths enables Marx’s concepton of a lfe lved well to escape the dfficultes of the 
dea that a lfe lved well s closest to the lfe of the Gods. Thus a lfe lved well for 
Marx s a lfe lved freely and the best lfe wll be one expressng the hghest or most 
dstnctvely human forms of freedom. For Marx, the counterpart of beng removed 
from the vcsstudes of fortune s the reducton to a mnmum of what he terms the 
sphere of necessty. As we wll see later, the hghest good s not a lfe of contempla-
ton but rather the development of human powers for ts own sake through the free 
Arstotle. Roman copy after a Greek bronze orgnal by 
Lysppos from 330 BC
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pursut of ends that human bengs ndvdually and collectvely choose for them-
selves, ndependently of naturally gven demands of survval and reproducton.
2. Aristotle’s Happy Lives
Arstotle ntroduces the dea of a lfe lved well by sayng that t s what everyone 
ams for n lfe. After dscussng n general terms what a good lfe amounts to — t 
must be an actvty, most pleasant, chosen for ts own sake, nclusve of all thngs 
chosen for ther own sake, and so on — Arstotle (1934:1098a) suggests that we can 
get beyond plattudes by comparng a good lfe wth performng one’s role well. A 
good shoemaker makes shoes well and a good flautst plays the flute well. So, Arsto-
tle suggests, a good person, or a person who lves well, wll do well n expressng n 
ther actons the dstngushng feature of persons.1
Arstotle clams that practcal or theoretcal thnkng n accordance wth reason 
s the dstngushng feature of persons. Arstotle equates ths wth a lfe n accord-
ance wth vrtue. Arstotle then clams that happness s really a lfe led n accordance 
wth the best or most final vrtue: “f happness conssts n actvty n accordance 
wth vrtue, t s reasonable that t should be actvty n accordance wth the hghest 
vrtue; and ths wll be the vrtue of the best part of us” (Arstotle, 1934:1177, 12–15). 
Arstotle concludes that happness conssts n contemplaton, whch s to say that 
t s thnkng dsplayng theoretcal wsdom, and offers some pretty bad arguments 
n favour of ths rather strange vew. Bostock (2000:200–201) rghtly observes how 
unattractve ths vew of happness seems.
Arstotle (1934:1177b) lsts some sgns that contemplaton s “perfect vrtue”: t 
s potentally the most contnuous of excellent actvtes; t s “admttedly” the most 
pleasant — or at least “contans pleasures of marvellous purty and permanence”; t 
wll also be most hghly “self-sufficent”, snce t s more soltary than poltcal actv-
tes that depend on how others fare for ther ntended effect. 
Be ths as t may, t s not clear why these features of contemplaton should be 
mportant to ts contrbuton to happness. Arstotle seems taken here wth a wor-
ry — later developed n Stoc and Epcuran phlosophes2 — that to am for goods 
that can be more easly taken away s msguded. From such a standpont, t s bet-
ter to set one’s sghts low or on nternal goods, as smple pleasures or pleasures of 
the ntellect are less capable of beng taken, and therefore more choce-worthy than 
more ntensely pleasurable but more vulnerable commtments. However, as Arstotle 
(1934:1100b30–34) hmself suggests, the dea that a happy lfe should be less causally 
1 Bostock (2000:16–17) explans how ths concepton fits n wth Arstotle’s overall vew of how the 
world works. If we do ndeed determne the functon of our parts by what they contrbute to a dstnc-
tvely human lfe, as Bostock suggests we determne what eyes are for, then ths would be an advantage 
of takng Arstotle’s vew.
2 Martha Nussbaum (1994:190–191) explans the hope of these phlosophes to nsulate lfe from human 
terrors n The Therapy of Desire.
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subject to setbacks s not the only way of seeng t as less vulnerable to msfortune. It 
could be seen that way prmarly because a happy person can endure “repeated and 
severe msfortune wth patence, not owng to nsensblty but to greatness of soul”.
Arstotle (1934:1100b15–20) smlarly supposes that happness must consst of 
actvtes that are “more lastng” and “most fully and contnuously occupy the lves 
of the supremely happy”, snce to have “the greatest and noblest of all thngs ... left to 
fortune would be contrary to the fitness of thngs” (Arstotle, 1934:1099b25). The 
happness of the Gods may provde a consolng vson of a happness proof aganst 
the threats to whch human happness s subject. However, human lves must seek out 
human goods, whch by ther nature can always be snatched away through wrongs 
or msfortune. Arstotle provdes no good reason to thnk otherwse, or for thnkng 
that the courage to face the rsks of human lfe (forttude) s not tself a vrtue and a 
consttuent part of happness.
Arstotle (1934:1097b10–20) suggests that the “self-sufficency” he s after s not 
a soltary lfe but smply the absence of serous shortcomngs n one’s happness. A 
ratonal verson of self-sufficent happness lke ths mght be a degree of happness 
so complete that there would be no pont to seekng some addtonal good n order 
to be happy, snce one s already happy enough. Lfe goes sufficently well for happy 
people for ther happness not to turn on better or worse fortune (Crsp, 1999:226). 
We could say that, whle both may be happy, the fortunate are especally blessed, 
whle the unlucky are not (Lawrence, 1999:187–191).
For Arstotle, a further recommendaton of contemplaton s that t nvolves le-
sure, whle the actvtes of a poltcal lfe are “unlesurely”. By “lesurely” Arstotle 
does not mean merely “dle” or lackng n effort. Hs ntenton s partly to contrast t 
wth actvtes that are drven by natural necessty, such as the practcal arts, whose 
end s bodly survval. However, “lesurely” must mean more than chosen wthout 
regard to natural necessty, snce poltcal lfe s also not always drven by natural 
necessty. Arstotle (1934:1177b10–15) seems to mply that poltcal lfe s not “le-
surely” because t s not carefree. However, t s not clear that the best lfe must be 
carefree. 
Arstotle has a further pont of dstncton between the poltcal and contempla-
tve lves: poltcal actvtes are carred on for some end other than themselves: one 
does not justly resolve conflcts for ther own sake only, as we would prefer to have 
fewer conflcts to resolve. We engage n poltcal actvty not just for ts own sake but 
also for the happness that t wll brng to others. Arstotle clams that contemplaton 
s engaged n for ts own sake only.
Arstotle (eg. 1934:1097b1–10; 1177b) clams a number of tmes that we seek hap-
pness for ts own sake only. Ths, however, seems false: whle I no doubt seek my 
own happness for ts own sake, I could qute easly also want to be happy because 
ths contrbutes to the happness of my frends and lovers, just as ther happness wll 
contrbute to mne. Arstotle mght respond that my happness conssts not only of 
what s good for me but also what s good for my famly, frends and communty. So 
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my happness s not a means to but con-
ssts n part of the happness of others. 
Nevertheless, even f my own happness 
ncludes the happness of others, t wll 
stll not be merely desrable for ts own 
sake but also may be desrable as a means 
to cvc peace.
In any case, f an actvty cannot con-
sttute happness unless t s engaged n 
only for ts own sake, ths would also rule 
out contemplaton, as not even t s en-
gaged n only for ts own sake. We often 
contemplate the truth n order to have 
better control over our lves. Although 
Arstotle (1981:1216b10–16) dsmsses the 
dea that knowledge of geometry could 
be useful, except accdentally, the ntrn-
sc purpose of modern scence clearly 
ncludes better control over natural proc-
esses. Better control of natural processes 
s as much a part of the ntrnsc am of 
modern scence as the welfare of ctzens 
s part of the ntrnsc am of poltcs.
Nor s t clear that contemplaton s 
the most desrable good, as Plato assumes 
t must be, when he argues aganst takng 
pleasure as the hghest good, because t can always be combned wth other goods to 
yeld a good that s more desred than pleasure on ts own (Arstotle, 1934:1097b15–
20; 1172b28–34). The exercse of theoretcal wsdom combned wth practcal ws-
dom seems more desrable for human bengs than the exercse of theoretcal wsdom 
on ts own. As Bostock (2000:202–3) argues, a lfe consstng only of the exercse of 
theoretcal wsdom s not a plausble canddate even for a good lfe, let alone the 
most perfect lfe. 
Kraut (1989:309, 53–7) suggests that practcal wsdom and other vrtues should be 
seen as ndspensable condtons of contemplaton. A lfe wthout them s less desr-
able than one wth them but ths s because they are essental condtons of a human 
lfe of contemplaton. Gods can be happy by contemplaton alone but human bengs 
cannot. If they are to contemplate, they must also lve well enough wth others to be 
untroubled n ther reflecton on scentfic truths.
However, I thnk a more thoroughgong change of orentaton s requred for a 
plausble account of human happness. If the assumptons that happness s pecularly 
“final” and causally proof aganst msfortune are dscarded, lttle remans to bolster 
Karl Marx (1818–1883)
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the vew that contemplaton s the most perfect among many vrtues. I have already 
noted that there s no reason to suppose that happness must be the least causally 
subject to msfortune, gven that t s proof to a degree aganst msfortune due to the 
forttude that accompanes t. Nor can I can see any good reason for supposng that 
happness must be pecularly final n the sense that t s sought for ts own sake only 
and not for any other end. 
Arstotle has gven no good reason to accept hs assumpton that, f there are 
many vrtues of the soul, happness must be the most perfect or most pecularly final 
of them. In Book I, Arstotle (1934:1098a14–19) states, almost as an asde, that “f 
there be several human excellences or vrtues”, then happness should be dentfied 
wth “the best and most perfect among them”.3 That happness should be dentfied 
wth the practce of the best among the human excellences seems reasonable, but 
Arstotle adds that t should be teliotaton, whch seems to mply that happness must 
be nothng but a final end wthout qualficaton: e purely final. Ths seems to mport 
the Platonc dea that thngs wll be best when they most purely exemplfy what they 
are.4 
Arstotle’s own vew that one acts best when one ams at the “mean” calls ths 
dea nto queston. In one sense, actng fearlessly n any crcumstance most purely 
exemplfies beng fearless. However, as Arstotle (1934:1117a20–25) ponts out, a 
courageous person does not act fearlessly n all crcumstances, snce n some cases 
that could well be rash. The most purely fearless act, n the sense of beng smlar to 
nothng but fearless acts, s not the best way to be fearless: n some crcumstances, 
to act courageously wll be hard to dscern from actng lke a coward. As Arstotle 
(1934:1109a1–10) notes, t s the smlarty between rashness and courage that leads 
us to call cowardce ts opposte, although rashness s also ts opposte. Smlarly, f 
happness s the end of lfe t does not follow that t must be nothng but an end of 
lfe. Wthout ths, and the prevous assumptons I have questoned as baseless, Ars-
totle’s case for takng happness as a lfe of contemplaton collapses. Whle one could 
try to make the most of Arstotle’s vew, f t s as baseless as I have clamed, another 
approach to the best lfe suggests tself.5
3 In Book X, Arstotle (1934:1177a12–14) shfts hs poston somewhat, clamng that “f happness 
conssts n actvty n accordance wth vrtue, t s reasonable that t should be actvty n accordance 
wth the hghest vrtue, and ths wll be the vrtue of the best part of us”. Ths also has some plausblty 
but does not lcense Arstotle’s further vew that, for varous reasons, ncludng that t s closest to the 
Gods, contemplaton s the best part of us.
4 There are other vews as to why Arstotle goes wrong here, ncludng that he plays on the ambguty of 
teleon.
5 Kenny (1992:93–6) takes ths vew also by suggestng that Arstotle has two versons of the good lfe. 
He argues that we should reject the “ntellectualst” verson and adopt nstead the vew that a good 
lfe ncludes all of the vrtues, whle the best lfe ncludes the most perfect vrtues. I propose a more 
thoroughgong rejecton of the dea that the good lfe s contemplaton. 
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3. Marx and the Best Human Life 
That Marx has an mplct dea of the best form of human lfe s undsputed: hs cr-
tque of alenaton under captalsm and prevous forms of socety s after all a crtque 
of ways of lvng that are dehumansed and thus ncapable of realsng what s best n 
human lfe. Marx’s concepton of the best form of human lfe s clearly nfluenced by 
Arstotle’s. Whle Arstotle dentfies a good lfe wth the fullest expresson of dstnc-
tvely human reason, Marx (1976:959; cf 1973:706) dentfies t wth the fullest scope 
for the exercse of dstnctvely human freedom, whch n turn he takes as the most 
extensve scope for the exercse of “human powers [whch have been developed] as 
an end n tself ”:
[The] realm of natural necessty expands wth hs development, because hs needs do 
too; but the productve forces to satsfy these expand at the same tme. Freedom, n ths 
sphere, can consst only n ths, that socalzed man, the assocated producers, govern 
the human metabolsm wth nature n a ratonal way, brng t under ther collectve con-
trol nstead of beng domnated by t as a blnd power; accomplshng t wth the least 
expendture of energy and n condtons most worthy and approprate for ther human 
nature. But ths always remans a realm of necessty. The true realm of freedom, the 
development of human powers as an end n tself, begns beyond t, though t can only 
floursh wth ths realm of necessty as ts bass. The reducton of the workng day s the 
basc prerequste.
The counterpart of happness as the expresson of vrtue s the expresson of human 
powers. The exercse of the fullest development of human powers as an end n tself on 
the bass of a reducton of the workng day to a mnmum corresponds wth Arstotle’s 
snglng out of contemplaton as the “lesurely” exercse of complete or perfect vrtue. 
Techncal excellence s ncluded as a central component of the full development of 
human powers rather than arbtrarly excluded from the scope of dstnctvely human 
excellences. However, Marx recognzes the element of truth n Arstotle’s excluson of 
techncal excellence: the labour of slaves, or any other forced form of socal coopera-
ton n producton, s the reverse of an expresson of human excellence: only when 
socal cooperaton s free ratonal cooperaton, can techncal excellence appear as a 
general vrtue rather than as the preserve of professons.
Marx takes the shft from the expresson of vrtue to the expresson of freedom 
as the substance of happness from Hegel. For Hegel, freedom n ts most developed 
form s a capacty to pursue happness n accordance wth vrtue. Hegel (1991:§§14–
21) begns hs account of the most developed form of freedom by rejectng Kant’s 
absolute dvson between “natural freedom” (beng able to act from one’s desres) 
and “practcal freedom”, whch s the power to know what s rght and the capacty 
to choose n accordance wth that knowledge.6 Hegel dstngushes three forms of 
6 Kant uses the Latn terms arbitrium liberum and arbitrium brutum for the dstncton.
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freedom: mmedate or natural freedom (correspondng wth Kant’s natural free-
dom); reflectve freedom; and ratonal freedom (correspondng wth Kant’s autono-
my). 
Hegel (1991:§20, §21) characterstcally recognzes reflectve freedom as a form 
of freedom ntermedate between natural and ratonal freedom, nto whch enters 
an element of reason requred for delberaton on ends wth a vew to happness. In 
a lfe of reflectve freedom, we exercse a capacty to stand back from any desre or 
nclnaton whatever and select whch of them to follow as part of an overall plan of 
lfe n pursut of happness (Hegel, 1991:§17, §20). Hegel consders that the dea of 
reflectve or “arbtrary” freedom captures the way freedom s usually understood. 
Nevertheless, reflectve freedom s lmted nasmuch as t takes desres and nclna-
tons as gvens of our nature and upbrngng, even though we may selectvely act 
upon them. 
Ratonal freedom goes further toward self-determnaton. For Hegel, the Bildung, 
or formaton, of a person whose actons embody ratonal or absolute freedom, re-
qures subjecton of desre to ratonal ethcal consderatons: “...lberaton s the hard 
work of opposng mere subjectvty of conduct, of opposng the mmedacy of de-
sre as well as the subjectve vanty of feelng and arbtrarness of caprce” (Hegel, 
1991:§187).
Hegel clams that full, ratonal freedom encapsulates both personal or subjectve 
freedom and what he terms objectve freedom. He takes objectve freedom to be a 
capacty to transcend nclnatons and desres to act for the rght reasons n the rght 
crcumstances — to grasp and to act on what s “unversal” — whch necessarly goes 
beyond mere reflectve delberaton on our desres n the pursut of happness (Patten, 
1999:48–51; cf. Arstotle, 1934:1115b17–21). Hegel thus attempts, along Arstotelan 
lnes, to artculate a more fully developed concept of happness as the realzaton of 
ratonal freedom, taken as the unty of subjectve and objectve freedom.
Wood (1990:70) suggests that Hegel’s concept of the lfe of absolute freedom or 
ratonal self-determnaton s nothng but the “truth”, or full realzaton, of happness: 
that s, happness nformed by reason as ethcal precept. Wood clams that Hegel’s 
ratonal free lfe goes beyond happness n the narrow sense of the coherent satsfac-
ton of desre by ntegratng t also wth non-self-nterested, other regardng desres 
nto a coherent reasoned whole. Only by beng ncluded wthn the scope of ratonal 
freedom can happness acheve ts complete, self-sufficent form, or become “true” 
happness (Hegel, 1991:§15). 
The ethcal precepts (Recht) by whch one’s pursut of satsfacton of desre s led 
nclude: a demand for respect of the unversal rghts of persons, taken as equal to 
those one would make for oneself; the clams of conscence; and the requrements 
of lvng together wth others wthn the spheres of the famly, cvl socety, and the 
state (“ethcal lfe”). In the sphere of the famly, ndvduals pursue ther own happ-
ness along wth and through the happness of others, wth whom they are ntmately 
connected by bonds of love. Indvduals ndrectly serve the nterests of others wthn 
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the sphere of cvl socety by pursung ther own nterests wthn the marketplace 
and professonal assocatons. The state, as Patten (1999:192) argues, s the sphere of 
other-regardng dspostons and vrtues, n whch ndvduals conscously cooperate 
wth others to pursue the nterests of all ctzens of the state under ethcal precepts. 
Ths s not to be confused wth the state n the narrow sense, as an nsttuton for the 
exercse of lethal force, for whch Hegel’s term s “Notstaat”.
Completed by the state, free actvty wthn the basc nsttutons of socety may 
be self-sustanng: “[Hegel’s] concern s to dentfy what features of the modern socal 
world make a sprt of ndependent personalty and subjectvty realzable n a stable 
and self-sustanng way” (Patten, 1999:182). Property and contract are necessary for 
personalty but n themselves prompt volatons of rghts. These volatons may be 
checked by the threat of retrbuton and the subjectve moral conscence of ndvdu-
als, but punshment may be unrelable and conscence subject to temptaton. Only 
wthn ethcal lfe, whch provdes sustanng customs and coercve nsttutons that 
develop the atttudes and habts of mutual respect for persons, can a free lfe be stable, 
secure and self-affirmng.
Hegel follows Arstotle n takng the ultmate form of happness to be closer to that 
of the Gods than ordnary human happness. From a materalst standpont, however, 
happness can hardly be seen n the same way. When human bengs are regarded n 
a thoroughgong way as natural bengs, t s not plausble to clam that happness s 
completed by a faculty of thought that brngs us closer to the Gods, or by compre-
hendng oneself as a self-conscous ncarnaton of Absolute Sprt: “to stand wth...
subjectve freedom not n the partcular and contngent stuaton, but n what has 
beng n and for tself ” (Hegel, 1991:22). For a materalst lke Marx, reason cannot be 
the “rose n the cross of the present”, as t s for Hegel. 
Marx regards Hegel’s partcular concepton of concrete freedom as a mystfica-
ton of the exceptonal creatve element n human reasonng, and of the cumulatve 
effects produced by the exercse of ths creatvty n human culture over generatons. 
However, Marx does not smply reject Hegel’s concept of ratonal freedom n favour 
of Hegel’s dea of reflectve freedom. Marx also thnks that dstnctvely human free-
dom cannot be based on desres taken as gvens. In the realm of true freedom, ntally 
gven desres are reformed through the creaton of collectve lfe (Bildung). Freedom 
for Marx (1975–1982, Ch. 2) s ndvdual freedom wthn free collectve lfe: “an asso-
caton n whch the free development of each s the condton for the free develop-
ment of all”.
Marx thus retans the dea that happness s more than the achevement n lfe of 
a way of ntegratng nto a coherent whole desres that are grounded n mmedate 
nature. Rather, happness s the achevement n lfe of a coherent, stable and self-
affirmng ntegraton of desres grounded n nature wth non-self-nterested, other 
regardng desres. Ths process of ntegraton nto a coherent whole transforms both 
natural and other regardng desres. For Marx as well as for Hegel, collectve customs 
and coercve nsttutons support ths by developng atttudes and habts of mutual 
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respect for persons. Marx’s materalst nterpretaton of freedom sees t as nvolvng 
a capacty to pursue ndvdual nterests wthn effectve structures for just socal 
cooperaton. Marx’s dea of freedom s thus very close to Rawls’s dea of the two 
moral powers of havng the capacty to act by a sense of justce and the capacty “to 
form, to revse, and to pursue a concepton of the good, and to delberate n accord-
ance wth t” (Rawls, 2005:72).
Marx also follows Hegel and Kant n vewng human freedom as dstnctve n 
the degree to whch t enables human bengs to pursue ends ndependently of natu-
ral drves. However, Marx construes freedom as a creatve capacty that expresses 
tself ntally n new ways of nteracton wth nature (Marx, 1973:611). The develop-
ment of our nteracton wth nature through technology and scence n turn dmn-
shes the degree to whch the struggle for exstence domnates human lfe and thus 
provdes scope for the expresson and development of human powers as an end n 
tself through human cultural creaton, ntally typfied n art, relgon, and phloso-
phy. The ends of human cultural creaton are pursued for ther own sake, but not for 
ther own sake only. Human freedom, n ths sense, comes to provde a space for new 
actvtes whose object has been determned by humans themselves ndependently 
of naturally gven drves, and thus gves a materalst nterpretaton to the dea that 
freedom properly begns only n acton whose ends are not dctated by nature (Marx, 
1981:959). Human bengs set ther own ultmate ends also by ncludng the develop-
ment of freedom tself, or ther capactes for the collectve pursut of ther nterests, 
among those ends. For Marx, the hghest good n a good lfe nvolves the exercse n 
practce of dstnctvely human freedom n ths sense.
4. Conclusion
Marx’s dea of the hghest good s a lfe that realzes n practce dstnctvely human 
freedom. Ths n turn s understood as a capacty to frame, revse and pursue a con-
cepton of the good, whch ntegrates self-regardng wth other regardng desres 
under an effectve concepton of justce. Ths dea of the hghest good has affintes 
wth the nclusve sense of the “hghest good” that Kenny attrbutes to Arstotle, but, 
happly, s much more remote from the dea of the “hghest good” as a lfe lved as 
close as possble to that of the Gods.
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